If the Mortensen and Pissarides model with efficient bargaining is calibrated to replicate the fluctuations of unemployment over the business cycle, it implies a far too strong rise of the unemployment rate when unemployment benefits rise. This paper explores an alternative, right-to-manage bargaining scheme. This also generates the right degree of fluctuations of unemployment but at the same time implies a reasonable elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits. JEL Classification System: E24,E32,J64,I38
Introduction
By how much does the unemployment rate fall when unemployment insurance benefits are reduced?
Calibrations of the textbook search and matching model that generate reasonably strong variations of unemployment over the business cycle, e.g. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007) , imply an unreasonably large drop of the unemployment rate when benefits are reduced; see Costain and Reiter (2008) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) .
An alternative to the widely used efficient bargaining scheme (EB, henceforth), which follows Trigari's (2006) right-to-manage (RTM, henceforth) assumption, can also be calibrated to achieve sufficient unemployment fluctuations; see Christoffel and Kuester (2008) . 1 The current paper shows that RTM, once calibrated to match fluctuations of unemployment over the business cycle, in contrast to EB implies a reasonable elasticity of the steady state unemployment rate to a change in benefits.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the calibration. Section 4 reproduces Costain and Reiter's (2008) result that with EB one can either produce reasonable unemployment fluctuations or a reasonable semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits, but not both. In contrast, the section shows, the model with RTM can achieve both. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The model is a real-business-cycle version of Trigari (2006) with fixed costs in period profits.
Families. There are infinitely many identical families in the economy with unit measure. These consist of a measure u t of unemployed and n t = 1 − u t employed members. The family maximizes the sum of unweighted expected utilities of its individual members
c t is the average consumption level of family members. h i,t are the hours worked by employed 1 Further explanations exist to solve Shimer's (2005) unemployment volatility puzzle; see Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) for an overview.
worker i. The family pools all income of its members. Its budget constraint is given by 
where the marginal utility of consumption is λ t = c
Firms. In period t there is a mass n t of operative one-worker firms (firm-worker matches).
Firm/match i can produce y i,t units of the homogeneous good according to
where z t is a shock to productivity. Real period profits are
where Φ ≥ 0 denotes a per-period fixed cost of production. 2
Matching firms and workers. The matching function governs the number of new matches, m t , such that
Separations occur with a constant, exogenous probability ϑ ∈ (0, 1), as in Shimer (2005) . Employment evolves according to
Match surplus. The family takes the labor supply decisions for its workers. The marginal gain of the family from having member i employed is
The first line reflects the wage income of the worker, forgone unemployment benefits, and the worker's disutility of work. The second line pertains to the continuation value of the match.
ut is the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job. The market value/surplus, J i,t , of firm i is
Vacancy posting. Vacancy posting costs, κ > 0, in equilibrium equal the discounted expected value of a firm,
where q t = mt vt is the probability of finding a worker.
Bargaining. Firms and workers split the match surplus by maximizing the Nash-product ∆
We look at two different bargaining schemes. 3
Efficient bargaining (EB). Firms and workers simultaneously bargain over wages and hours.
The first-order condition for hours equates the marginal product of labor to the worker's marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption: z t αh
λt . The firstorder condition for wages results in the surplus sharing rule
The model generates enough cyclical variation of the unemployment rate if profits in steady state are sufficiently low, and thus J is low, too; see Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007) . Equation (10) then implies that the worker's surplus from working, ∆, will also be small in steady state.
Therefore, a minor change in benefits can shift the outside option of the worker by enough to generate a sizable change in the unemployment rate; see, e.g., Costain and Reiter (2008) .
2. Right-to-manage (RTM). The firm and the worker bargain about the wage rate only. Given this wage, the firm demands hours of work so as to maximize period profits Ψ t , given by (5).
The firm's first-order-condition for hours equates the marginal product of labor and the wage rate, z t αh α−1 t = w t . The first-order condition for wages yields a "modified" surplus sharing
Whenever the worker's marginal rate of substitution, mrs t := κ L h ϕ t λt , exceeds the wage rate in steady state, relative to EB, the value of the worker's surplus, ∆, will be greater for any value of the firm, J. 5 In the calibration, therefore, profits can be low while still allowing for a large surplus of the worker, even for conventional values of the bargaining power, η. Further, as the first-order condition for hours worked suggests, profits in this scheme are not as responsive to changes to the worker's outside option and mrs. RTM can replicate fluctuations in the labor market once fixed costs are sufficiently positive.
Government. The government collects taxes to offset benefit payments, t t = u t b.
Market clearing. Goods market clearing requires
4 Equation (11) can be derived as follows. Under RTM the wage bargaining problem is
The first-order condition for the wage is
The worker's surplus can be written as ∆t = wtht −
+tiw, where tiw summarizes terms independent of the current period's wage bargaining (constants and the continuation value). Thereby
The first-order condition for hours gives ht = into the wage bargaining first-order condition yields (11).
5 The condition mrs > w also holds for EB in the calibration below. It is not special to RTM. In fact, under EB, as α → 1, mrs > w is a necessary condition for Ψ > 0 and thus for an equilibrium with κ > 0. The civilian unemployment rate used is for the age group 16 years old and older. Overall, as far as business cycle fluctuations are concerned, the RTM and the EB models with fixed costs behave very similarly. In particular, both replicate the correlation between unemployment, vacancies, and output equally well (see rows labeled "Beveridge curve"), and both generate a similar degree of fluctuations of wages. Turning to the key result of this paper, the final row of Table 2 , titled
Results
, reports the semielasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits in the data and the four model variants. The final column replicates the result in Costain and Reiter (2008) : the model with EB, when calibrated to match the fluctuations of vacancies and unemployment, fails to produce a meaningful semielasticity of unemployment with respect to changes in the replacement rate. Given a semi-elasticity of 12.28, the steady state unemployment rate would fall from 6% to 5.3% if the replacement rate, b wh , were reduced by 1 percentage point, i.e., from 40% in our calibration to 39%. The reason for this strong effect is the following. To reproduce unemployment fluctuations, the firm's surplus in steady state, J, needs to be small under both EB and RTM. Yet for EB, as the first-order condition (10) shows, a small surplus for the firm also means a small surplus for the worker (∆). Since the worker is close to indifferent between working and not working, a small change in benefits implies a strong change in work incentives for a given wage, and thus a strong change in unemployment.
The same is not true under RTM. First-order condition (11) implies that the worker's surplus can be big even if the firm's surplus is not. 6 This implies a considerably more moderate reaction of work incentives to changes in benefits. If the RTM model is calibrated to match the fluctuations of unemployment over the business cycle, it produces a semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits equal to 1.68. This is close to the estimates in the literature summarized by Costain and Reiter (2008) and implies that the unemployment rate would fall from 6% to 5.9% in the long run if the replacement rate, b wh , were to fall from 40% to 39%.
Conclusions
This paper argued that a model with right-to-manage bargaining, i.e., a model in which the firm and the worker bargain only about hourly wages, and in which the firm retains the decision on the intensive (hours worked) margin, can be calibrated to quantitatively generate both realistic unemployment fluctuations over the business cycle and a realistic long-run response of unemployment levels to a change in the replacement rate, while the same is not true for a textbook model with 6 In our calibration the worker's surplus is 27 times as large as the firm's surplus; see Table 1 . efficient bargaining. . Total production is y = 1. κ is adjusted to match u = 6%. Φ (when not equal to zero) is set to match the relative standard deviation of unemployment and output in the data. Monthly model. Entry · means: same value as to the left. Costain and Reiter (2008) .
